The article “When do boards of directors contribute to shareholder value in firms targeted for acquisition? A group information-processing perspective,” co-authored with Stevo Pavicevic (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management) and John Haleblian (University of California, Riverside), has been accepted for publication in Organization Science. The paper draws on group information-processing theory to investigate how target boards of directors may contribute to target value capture during the private negotiations stage in acquisitions. Target boards are conceptualized as information-processing groups and private negotiations as information-processing tasks. The authors argue that target board meeting frequency is associated with increased processing – gathering, sharing, and analyzing – of acquisition-related information, which improves target bargaining and, ultimately, target value capture. They further posit that this value-enhancing effect of target board meeting frequency is more pronounced when target board composition improves the ability of target boards to process acquisition-related information. Finally, the authors predict that meeting frequency is more consequential for target bargaining and value capture when acquisition complexity imposes high information-processing demands on the target board during private negotiations. Empirical evidence from a sample of acquisitions of publicly listed firms in the United States offers support for the group information-processing perspective on board contribution to shareholder value in firms targeted for acquisition.