



Funktionalismus

Wenn die Makro- die Mikroebene nicht braucht

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HS 2022, 21. November

Gastvortrag «Vorlesung Wissenschaftstheorie»

Literatur. A. Rosenberg (2016): «Functionalism as a Research Program»
In: «Philosophy of Social Science», S. 195-210



Folk psychology in der Ökonomik

Welt innerhalb des Kopfes

Beliefs,
Expectations

«In der Schale ist ein Apfel»

Desires,
Preferences

«Ich will einen Apfel essen»

Motivation / Intention



«Ich sollte zur Schale gehen»

Entscheidung

Welt außerhalb des Kopfes

Handlung



Das «Warum» fragt nach der Erklärung.

$L_1, L_2, \dots, L_n ?$ Nach welchen allgemeinen Gesetzen
 $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m ?$ und aufgrund welcher Bedingungen
 $E !$ tritt das Phänomen auf?

Wenn wir in der ersten Zeile die Rational Choice Theory einsetzen, dann müssen wir wissen, was «im Kopf» vorgeht. Da dies nicht möglich ist, wird etwa von «imaginären Akteuren» ausgegangen. Durch diese kontrafaktische Annahme wird nicht länger etwas über die Wirklichkeit ausgesagt, sondern über eine hypothetische Modellwelt.



- «Functionalism as an explanatory strategy is fairly obvious and common, both in ordinary life and in biology.
- We often explain something's character or even its very existence by citing the function it serves.
- The function something serves is one or more of its effects, or the effects of its presence and behavior.
- The presence or operation of something has indefinitely many effects, but only a few of them are among its functions.»



Ohne dass es jemand wollte

- «To understand the strategy of functionalism, consider some examples.
- «What's that rock doing in front of the door? It's a doorstop.»
- «Why does the heart beat? In order to circulate the blood.»
- As we have seen..., both of these explanations are problematical: the ordinary one because it is intentional, and the biological one because it isn't!
- That is, explaining something's purposes in terms of our desires and beliefs introduces all the problems of intentionality—
 - how do our beliefs and desires represent things, how do they have content?
 - Explaining something in terms of purposes that no person has seems to require the desires of God, or some other intelligent agent that modern science would rather not have to invoke.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «Philosophy of Social Science», S. 196



- «Structuralism labels the thesis that there are features – structures – of society
- that are necessary for its persistence but not intentionally constructed or even noticed by its participants,
- and that therefore these structures can't be reduced to or explained in terms of the behavior or the thoughts of individuals and groups of them.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 196



- «Consider the question of why the market price system is almost universal, even in societies where governments attempt to suppress them.
- The answer to this question is that the price system is universal in human societies because it fills a function:
 - coordinating production capacities and consumption
 - demands that no individual or group, even armed with a most powerful supercomputer, could achieve.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 196



- «The puzzle is giving an analysis of how it is that something could have arisen and persisted in human society
- that fulfils a function so beautifully but that no one could have designed or could maintain.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 196



- «Just as there are many ways something can be a clock,
- there are many different packages of different individuals' psychological attitudes, beliefs, wants, hopes, fears, preferences,
- and the behaviors they bring about,
- which can go together to constitute a social class, or a religious ritual, or a cricket match.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 198



- «So this «causal role» account of how the concept of function sometimes works in biology
- has little relevance to the present problem.
- We still need to know by what right the holist, or any social scientist for that matter,
- attributes a function, especially a latent one, to a social institution.»

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 208



- «Meanwhile, the main conclusions that need to be emphasized about functionalism in the social sciences are these:
- First, almost everything of interest in human affairs has functions and indeed most things of interest in social science are identified by mentioning their functions.
- Second, the fact that something has a function requires explanation.
- In the case of artifacts with functions we designed them to have, the explanation is obvious.
- **But few social institutions and fewer of their functions are the results of conscious intentional design by anyone.»**

A. Rosenberg (2016): «*Philosophy of Social Science*», S. 209