



Lehrstuhl für Services- und Operationsmanagement

Doktorandenseminar Nr. 441

Mixed Oligopolies

Doktorandenseminar in Services- und Operationsmanagement

29. & 31. Mai 2006

- Zeit:** jeweils 10:15-12:00 und 14:15-16:00
- Ort:** Seminarraum WIG D 02, UG Winterthurerstrasse 92, 8006 Zürich,
(Tramhaltestelle „Letzistrasse“, Tram Nr. 9 oder 10)
- Sprache:** Englisch
- Anmeldung:** Anmeldungen bitte ab sofort beim Sekretariat
(sekretariat.dietl@isu.unizh.ch),
Angaben: Name, Vorname, Emailadresse, Matrikelnummer, Lehrstuhl
Anmeldeschluss: 19. Mai 2006
Die Teilnehmerzahl ist beschränkt. Im Falle von Überschussnachfrage
behalten wir uns eine Selektion der Teilnehmer vor.
- Leistungsnachweis:** Voraussetzungen für den Erhalt eines Doktorandenscheins sind das vorgängige Studium der angegebenen Pflichtliteratur, sowie die aktive und regelmässige Teilnahme an der Diskussion.

Wir freuen uns das Seminar in Kooperation mit Herrn Philippe De Donder von der Universität Toulouse durchführen zu können.

Thema

The mixed oligopoly literature analyzes equilibria in industries with competition between a small number of firms whose objectives differ. Most of the literature assumes that a private, profit-maximizing firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. The course will consist in a survey of this literature. The papers presented differ mainly in the timing of the game played by the firms (simultaneous or sequential), and in their control variables (quantity or price). Recent papers assume that a firm may be semi-public, in which case it maximizes a convex combination of profit and welfare.

This course aims at answering the following question:

- What are the conditions under which it is optimal to have at least one welfare-maximizing firm in an industry?



- What is the optimal proportion of shares that the government should own in a public firm
- What should be the objectives assigned by the government to a public firm?

We will also treat the situation where profit-maximizing firms compete with employees-managed firms. We will contrast the results obtained when all these firms produce homogeneous vs. differentiated goods.

Referenzen (Pflicht)

De Fraja G and F Delbono, 1990, Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 4, 1-17.

Referenzen (Allgemein)

Beato P and A Mas-Colell, 1984, The marginal cost pricing rule as a regulation mechanism in mixed markets, in *The Performance of Public Enterprises*, eds Par M. Marchand, P. Pestieau and H. Tulkens, Elsevier (North Holland).

Cremer H and J Crémer, 1994, Employee control and oligopoly in a free market economy, *Annales d'économie et de statistique*, 33, 29-49.

Cremer H, M De Rycke et A. Grimaud, 1997, Service quality, competition and regulatory policies in the postal sector, *Journal of Regulatory Economics* 11, 5-19.

Cremer H., M. Marchand et JF Thisse, 1989, The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market, *Oxford Economic Papers* 41, 283-301.

Cremer H., M. Marchand and JF Thisse, 1991, Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 9, 45-53.

De Donder P, L'entreprise publique en concurrence: les oligopoles mixtes, *Revue Française d'Economie*, Vol. XX, 11-50, October 2005.

Grilo I, 1994, Mixed duopoly under vertical differentiation, *Annales d'économie et de statistique*, 33, 91-112.

Matsumura T, 1998, Partial privatization in mixed duopoly, *Journal of Public Economics* 70, 473-483.

White M, 2001, Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms, *European Journal of Political Economy* 17, 877-896.

White M, 2002, Political manipulation of a public firms objective function, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 49, 487-499.